When we entered the fire protection industry in 1976, we quickly discovered the severe limitations in accessing passive fire protection materials. At the time, suppliers were limited to companies like Promat, Nullifire, and Hilti — and even then, in small quantities and with relatively few tested systems and applications compared to what is available in today’s market.

 

Part of this constraint was due to the extended development cycles of the time. The existing BS 476 standards were vague and broad, requiring extensive debate within the testing industry due to the lack of a specific framework for testing and applying fire-stopping products. This situation persisted until the introduction of more robust and relevant EN standards for penetration and linear gap seals. Even today, BS 476: Part 20 continues to be referenced in many projects, despite its well-known shortcomings in guiding fire-stopping material usage and applications and its severe lack of testing protocols for fire stopping and linear gap seals, essentially the BS 476:Part 20 standards provides zero guidance or protocols for the testing of products and systems for these applications.

 

From the 1970s through the mid-1990s, the fire-stopping industry (and passive fire protection in general) remained largely misunderstood and underdeveloped. It was dominated by a few major suppliers and frequently misused by all too many less ethical manufacturers who exploited the general lack of awareness within the building and construction sectors. Fire-stopping and linear gap seals were often ignored or poorly executed due to the widespread knowledge gap.

 

 

It wasn’t until the early to mid-1990s — triggered by major fires and incidents such as the Broadgate and the Bishopsgate bombings in London — that the industry began to change. These events brought about a growing awareness of the need to prevent the spread of fire and, even more critically, smoke control throughout buildings.

 

During these early years, man-made mineral fibre systems were prevalent. These systems continued to be used well into the 2000s. Material stockists slowly began to carry more of these products, but the industry’s growth was sluggish. Fire-stopping was still considered a mysterious and high-risk specialty, and many contractors were reluctant to engage in installations they didn’t fully understand. In the 1990s and early 2000s, intumescent paints were equally largely misunderstood, while board systems and cementitious spray coatings played a key role in protecting structural steel, ventilation ducts, and smoke extract systems.

 

The devastating fires at Windsor Castle, Stuttgart Airport, and King’s Cross to name but a few, along with terrorist bombings across the UK, eventually began to shift attitudes within the construction industry. We could finally have conversations with main contractors about passive fire protection, including fire-stopping and linear seals. However, even with increased awareness, many developers still avoided these installations — either due to lack of budgeting or a continued lack of experience.

 

From the late 2000s, specialist companies began to emerge, particularly focused on passive fire protection and fire-stopping. Yet progress remained painfully slow. Clients often prioritised aesthetics over safety. Passive fire protection remained hidden and misunderstood, leading to continued use of untested, low-cost materials installed by untrained contractors, not helped by the knowledge and experience of local building control officers’ positions being vacated in cost cutting measures, and a general lack of knowledge within the architectural and specification bodies, who often cannot differentiate between reaction to fire and fire resistance.

 

This toxic combination directly contributed to tragedies like the Grenfell disaster. There, improperly specified or substituted materials were incorrectly installed without any full understanding of the consequences. Combined with poor workmanship, a lack of qualified on-site oversight, and a dangerously casual attitude that “all fire-stopping systems are the same,” the result was catastrophic.

 

After Grenfell, where 72 lives were lost, the public outcry was immense. Unfortunately, the industry’s reaction was equally problematic. A wave of so-called “specialist” contractors appeared almost overnight. People from unrelated trades — yesterday a forklift driver, today a fire-stopper — flooded the market.

 

 

Many companies grew rapidly through questionable means, with operatives learning on the job while claiming non-existent expertise.

 

Is it any surprise, then, that after conducting more than 2,000 property inspections, we have found that virtually none have passed a detailed review by qualified inspectors? Even projects claiming to have third-party certification (e.g., SKEB) frequently fail to meet minimum standards and continue to do so under their current structure.

 

Since Grenfell, efforts to improve legislation have led to the introduction of the Building Safety Act in 2022, with a key focus on managing fire safety. The Act mandates that risks to building safety—fire included—be actively managed. This involves identifying potential fire hazards and taking appropriate measures, such as fire stopping. It also emphasises the need for competence throughout the construction process, especially in fire safety, to ensure that safety measures are properly installed.  The Act designates an accountable person responsible for ensuring the building is correctly installed, maintained, and monitored—an area we’ve highlighted as being inadequately addressed, which could lead to significant issues for those accountable in the future.

 

We often ask ourselves: “why do we continue this fight?” After decades in the industry, real progress remains minimal. While various schemes and certifications exist, they are often little more than window dressing, those running such courses often severely lacking in real knowledge of the huge variety of products and systems in the market, thus leaving occupants vulnerable in buildings that remain fundamentally unsafe. There is no true appetite to invest in improvements. There are too few experienced installers, specifiers, and inspectors, and it is absurd — even criminal — that someone can take a one-week course and claim to be a fire-stopping expert.

 

In the race to secure contracts, a wide range of trades — including general construction firms, bricklayers, plasterers, dry liners, plumbers, and even companies specialising in fire extinguishers, alarms, electrical systems, and data cabling — have expanded into fire-stopping. The list is seemingly endless.

 

However, while these companies may have experience in their respective trades, they lack the background and technical understanding required for passive fire protection. Through framework contractors and site access, many have adopted fire-stopping as a bolt-on service — without proper training, certification, or knowledge of the tested products and systems.

 

As a result, long-established specialist firms who have spent decades building this industry have seen a significant decline — not only in available work, but in overall standards. The level of professionalism has deteriorated dramatically, replaced by poorly executed installations that must often be completely removed and then correctly reinstated to be in line with the manufacturer’s tested and approved specifications, this is particularly prevalent in High-Risk Buildings (HRBs).

 

 

This drive to deliver everything at the lowest possible cost has devastated workmanship and eroded safety standards. Third-party certification, which began as a noble concept to assure quality, has lost much of its credibility. Under qualified inspectors frequently fail to enforce regulations or identify fundamental risks, in many cases because these relatively untrained and inexperienced so-called inspectors have no idea what they are actually looking at.

 

We hold file after file of inspection reports on systems that were installed just days prior — and yet the entire works needed to be stripped and reinstalled in order to provide any degree of fire-resistant performance. Yet still, contractors often dismiss our findings with remarks such as, “It’s been signed off. We’ve got our certificate — that’s all that matters.” Personally, we are convinced that if we provided a contractor with a letter stating, “this piece of paper offers 60 minutes fire resistance”, it would be accepted, simply because their knowledge of passive fire protection is limited in the extreme, and for the most part, they are just ticking boxes and passing the responsibility down the chain.

 

Let’s be clear: third-party certification is not a licence to walk away. It is a logging mechanism — nothing more. It carries no legal or regulatory weight unless the installation has been verified by the manufacturer as being installed strictly in accordance with their tested, approved and certified details.

 

This situation is not limited to isolated incidents. It applies to virtually every single contract we’ve inspected over the past eight years — including care homes, hospitals, police stations (even the National Crime Agency), and rail infrastructure. Almost every inspection has failed — due to a combination of incorrect materials, improper installation, and a staggering lack of training and experience. It’s crucial to address the need for a more thorough investigation before the situation worsens. By voicing our concerns, we aim to shed light on an issue that’s very clear but remains unresolved.

 

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